

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT No. 60

28 JUNE 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUT. COMDR. BOONE

Subject: Japanese Diplomatic Traffic dated 1941.

Encl: (A) Analysis of Japanese Diplomatic messages on the Tokyo to Washington and Washington to Tokyo circuits from 1 January 1941 through 7 December 1941 which were missing or not translated.

1. At the request of Lieut. (jg) Connorton an inquiry has been made as to the sources from which intercepted Japanese Diplomatic traffic was received during 1941.

2. Mr. C. E. Fleming of GW recalls that during 1941 most of the Japanese Diplomatic traffic on the Washington-Tokyo and Tokyo-Washington circuits was intercepted by Station S. Some messages were missed due to static, atmospheric disturbances and incomplete coverage of all frequencies.

3. Other stations intercepting Diplomatic traffic were Stations A, W, S and H. These stations were assigned certain frequencies to cover. GX would have records of which frequencies were assigned to these stations.

4. Until the United States entered the war, little material was received directly from Western Union, Mackay Radio & Telegraph and other commercial concerns. Messages sent via these companies were often intercepted by RCA and forwarded to OP-20-G. After the outbreak of war, solid files were sent from these companies as well as from the All-America Cables & Radio Co. to OP-20-G.

5. It might be possible to trace some of the missing messages to the files held by the Army. During 1941 the Army and the Navy alternated days in processing Diplomatic traffic. It seems logical that the Army would have had a comparable number of unreadable and badly garbled messages as the Navy.

6. Any logs which dealt with the disposition of intercepted traffic and were originally held by GW have since been turned over to Lieut. Comdr. Murray and Lieut. Comdr. Raven.

SALLY T. LIGHTLE,
Lieut. (jg), USNR.

Certified a true copy of a document on file In Op-20-G.

G. E. BOONE,
Lt. Comdr., U. S. N. R.

28 JUNE 1944.

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Enclosure (A).

*Analysis of Japanese Diplomatic Messages on the Tokyo-Washington Circuit,
1 January-7 December 1941*

Month	Total msgs sent	Msgs un- account- ed for	Msgs not trans- lated	Total msgs not available	Total msgs available
January.....	45	15	8	23	22
February.....	62	18	15	33	29
March.....	45	29	6	35	10
April.....	35	11	10	21	14
May.....	77	27	14	41	36
June.....	56	18	12	30	26
July.....	116	42	21	63	53
August.....	82	29	22	43	39
September.....	96	33	18	51	45
October.....	103	27	26	53	50
November.....	140	37	15	52	88
December (1-7).....	55	12	11	23	32
Total.....	912	290	178	468	444

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Analysis of Japanese diplomatic messages on the Washington-Tokyo circuit, 1 January-7 December 1941

Month	Total msgs sent	Msgs un- account- ed for	Msgs not trans- lated	Total msgs not available	Total msgs available
January.....	62	21	15	36	26
February.....	65	22	14	36	29
March.....	65	21	13	34	31
April.....	67	26	10	36	31
May.....	103	35	19	54	49
June.....	90	33	18	51	39
July.....	176	53	41	94	82
August.....	133	44	32	76	57
September.....	121	36	23	59	62
October.....	140	57	30	87	53
November.....	200	42	37	79	121
December (1-7).....	59	17	15	32	27
Total.....	1281	407	267	674	607

28 SEPTEMBER 1944

Following is a rough count of the number of worksheets held by GL-6 in CA, J-19, J-22, LA, PA-K2 and PURPLE diplomatic systems for the period from 1 November 1941 through 8 December 1941.

System	Total # of msgs.	# of msgs translated	# not trans- lated	# partially broken
CA.....	7	1	6	-----
J-19.....	472	75	394	3
J-22.....	192	6	146	40
LA.....	650	12	481	157
PA-K2.....	52	13	23	16
PURPLE.....	628	417	211	-----
Total.....	2,001	524	1,261	216

Most of the worksheets have a teletype or station intercept sheet attached. Some have both the original and carbon of the teletype message attached.

Certified a true copy of a document on file in OP-20-G.

G. E. BOONE,
Lt. Comdr., U. S. N. R.

Following is a survey of messages received by OP-20-G from 1-8 December 1941 showing the number received from each Station and the approximate time-lag involved. The information for this survey was taken from the GY Section Log for 1941 December.

Station	# Msgs.	Time Lag
Sta. 1 Monmouth.....	9	2 days
Sta. 2 San Fran.....	5	3 "
Sta. 3 Fort Sam Houston.....	4	3 days
	1	4 "
	1	2 days
	1	3 "
	2	4 "
Sta. 5 Fort Shafter.....	2	1 day
	10	2 days
	1	3 "
	6	4 "
Sta. 6 Fort Mills.....	2	same day
	1	1 day
	3	3 days
	7	6 days
	11	7 "
	8	8 "
Sta. 7 Fort Hunt.....	1	same day
	17	1 day
	3	2 days
Sta. 9 Rio De Janeiro.....	2	11 days

Station	# Msgs.	Time Lag
ALUSNA N. A.	2	1 day
	1	2 days
	1	4 "
	1	6 "
	1	11 days
	2	12 "
Army	1	1 day
	1	6 days
	2	7 "
CA	1	same day
	4	4 days
COM 16 122 SRI (Fort Dix?)	3	same day
	59	1 day
	4	2 days
	1	3 days
	5	5 "
	1	9 "
G Amagansett	1	same day
M Cheltenham	9	same day
	2	1 day
	2	2 days
Photo	1	7 days
	1	8 "
S Bainbridge	72	same day
	12	1 day
	1	6 days
SISIS Army	2	1 day
	1	2 days
	1	7 "
	1	8 "
W Winter Harbor	8	same day
	2	1 day
	1	3 days
X Photo	2	2 days
	1	7 "

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G. E. Boone,
Lt. Comdr. U. S. N. R.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.
Washington, 6 January 1944.

Memorandum to GY:

1. Lieutenant Commander A. A. Murray and Lieutenant A. L. Braun were Watch Officers on the "Security" or "Purple" watch during the last half of 1941 and the first half of 1942. Lieutenant Commander Lafore was in charge of the watch (later known as GY-2) from about February 1942, (relieving Lieutenant Commander Linn).

2. The security watch worked Purple traffic on alternate days, the Army working the other days.

3. The traffic, besides that received from the Army, was received by teletype. If dated an Army date, it was sent to the Army; if dated our date, we worked it and sent the work sheet with the original message attached to GZ. Therefore, in general, we kept no original teletype traffic. We, however, maintained a file for each originator and into these files we put garbled messages, confirming copies of messages from our intercept stations and duplicate messages. These files also contained messages for earlier periods (1939-40), which had never been worked. It is possible that at intervals the files were reduced by the burning of the older dupes. (Our recollections on this are not clear.)

4. GZ had access to our files and frequently used material from them.

5. All plain text messages which came in were given to GZ. We kept no file of them.

6. When the Army took over the diplomatic system (about June, 1942), these files were turned over to them along with the machine, pertinent aids, forms, etc.

R. W. Lafore,
R. W. LAFORE,
Lt. Comdr., USNR.
A. A. Murray,
A. A. MURRAY,
Lt. Comdr., USNR.
A. L. Braun,
A. L. BRAUN,
Lt., USNR.